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Abstract : This paper o¤ers a new theory of discrimination in the workplace. We
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1 Introduction
Suppose you, John, and his father, Pete, run a small business where social skills
matter a lot. Johns father is formally responsible for this business. You and John
are juniors. Both of you are uncertain about your own skills and each others skills.
Pete, by contrast, is very experienced. You and John are sure that he has a good
view of your and Johns skills. On a certain day, Johns father announces that he
resigns and that he confers the responsibility for the business to his son. He told
you and his son that this promotiondecision was based on his perception that his
son has the better social skills.
How is your perception of your social skills a¤ected by Petes promotion decision?
You may conclude that John has better social skills than you have. Pete made him
responsible for the business after all. In a similar way, Petes promotion decision
may boost Johns perception of his social skills. Alternatively, and perhaps more
likely, you and John may believe that because John is Petes son, Petes promotion
decision contains little information about your and Johns skills. Only if Johns
skills were very poor, Pete would have chosen you. Conveying responsibility to you,
however, would have damaged Johns perception of his social skills severely.
In the above example inferences depend on beliefs. The e¤ect of Petes promotion
decision on your perception of your social skills depends on your belief about whether
or not Pete treats his son as the favorite. As important is that Johns and your
beliefs may a¤ect Petes promotion decision. If conveying responsibility to you
severely damages Johns perception of his social skills, it may be in the interest
of the business to convey responsibility to John even though your social skills are
better developed.
This paper o¤ers a new theory of discrimination in the workplace. We model
a situation where two tasks have to be performed, a major task and a minor one.
A manager must assign these two tasks to two employees. One might associate
the major task with a promotion. The model we propose has three important
features. First, an employees e¤ort and his ability are complements. Second, the
manager has better information about the employeesabilities than the employees
themselves. Finally, the manager can only convey information about the employees
abilities through the task-assignment decision. We say that the manager follows a
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discriminatory strategy if she intentionally sometimes gives the major task to the
employee with the lower ability.
We start with analyzing a simple model in which employeesabilities are uni-
formly distributed, and tasks contribute equally to the output of the organization.
We show that in this environment the manager follows an assignment rule that
favors one of the employees. The reason is that the manager has an incentive to
conrm any belief that implies that one employee is favored by the other. The
above example gives the intuition. If both you and John believe that John will be
promoted unless his social skills are by far inferior to yours, promoting you would
imply that Johns skills are very poor. This would destroy Johns motivation. As a
result, it is not only in Johns interest that he is promoted. It is also good for the
business. In the basic model, an equilibrium also exists in which the manager does
not discriminate. We show that this equilibrium is optimal from the managers per-
spective. However, we also show that this equilibrium is not stable in the sense that
the slightest anticipation of discrimination would push behavior to a discriminatory
equilibrium. The implication is that newreasons to expect discrimination become
self-fullling relatively easily. Our model thus explains why discrimination has been
prevalent in many di¤erent forms throughout history and cultures.
Having established that in the most neutral version of our model discrimination
is almost unavoidable, we proceed by analyzing less neutral versions of our model.
First, we relax the assumption that tasks are equally productive. We show that the
more tasks di¤er in importance, the less managers discriminate. The intuition is
straightforward. Managers tend to conrm beliefs in order to avoid demotivating
the favorite. The cost is a distorted allocation of tasks. Discrimination jeopardizes
good matches between people and tasks. The more tasks di¤er in importance, the
more important it is that the more able person performs the more productive task.
Second, we replace the assumption that employees are equally able ex ante with
the assumption that the ability of each employee is drawn from a di¤erent distribu-
tion function. Specically, we assume that both employees believe that top talents
come from one identiable group of workers. These beliefs might be sheer preju-
dices. We show that such prejudices lead to stronger incentives to discriminate. In
the interest of the rm, a manager tends to conrm prejudices.
In our model the tendency to discriminate stems from fear to demotivate the
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favorite. The extent to which the favorite is demotivated depends on his initial
beliefs. One might think that if the favorite already believes that he is not very
able, passing him is less costly. We show that this intuition is correct. Managers
incentives to discriminate are stronger in environments where employees are more
likely to be able.
Our model is not only applicable to gender, race, religion or family ties as grounds
for discrimination. It can be applied to all possible di¤erences between employees
that may lead to di¤erent beliefs. For example, once the employees believe that the
manager favors one employee because this employee and the manager both like red
wine, the manager has an incentive to conrm those beliefs. This makes our message
very negative: we expect discrimination or favoritism to be recurring and ubiquitous
on the workoor. The wide variety of possible grounds for discrimination makes it
for the government hard to combat it by enacting laws that prohibit discrimination.
Of course, the government can prohibit discrimination against women. However,
it seems more di¢ cult to prohibit discrimination against white wine lovers. More
optimistically, our results suggest that organisations themselves may avoid discrim-
ination by a proper design of tasks or jobs. In addition, our paper shows that in
tournament settings discrimination is more likely to occur than in up-or-out settings.
In our model the manager has no taste for discrimination (Becker, 1957). More-
over, the manager observes the employeesabilities, implying that she does not need
to use a physical attribute as a signal of employee productivity (Phelps, 1972).
Tastes for discrimination or fear for being evaluated on the basis of a physical at-
tribute may give rise to beliefs that eventually lead to discrimination. In our model,
however, we do not need that employees belong to a well-dened group, as the above
example of sharing a love for red wine suggests. For this reason, our model can also
be regarded as a model of favoritism.
2 Literature
The model we develop builds on the recent literature on condence management.
Key in this literature is that employees have imperfect knowledge about their abil-
ities, and that managerial decisions contain information about their abilities (Bén-
abou and Tirole, 2003). The implication is that managerial decisions may a¤ect
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employeesmotivation. Ishida (2006) applies this idea to promotion decisions. In
his model, e¤ort and ability are complements, and the manager wants more able
employees to be promoted. Ishida shows that in this setting managers are inclined
to promote employees at lower ability levels to boost their self-condence. Crutzen
et al. (2013) examine a tournament model à la Lazear and Rosen (1981) in which
two employees compete for a promotion or an important task. Like us, the man-
agers task assignment decision a¤ects the employeesperceptions of their abilities.
Unlike us, the manager also has the option to abstain from di¤erentiating employees.
Their main result is that in order to avoid damaging the self-condence of one of
the employees, managers tend to avoid promotion or allocation of tasks on the basis
of abilities. The intuition for this result is well captured by a quote from Takeuchi
(1985),  .. the promotion of only one or two persons will cause the remaining
twentyodd employees to lose their will to work. Crutzen et al. (2013) provide an
explanation for why promotions are sometimes seniority based rather than merit
based. Likewise, Prendergast (1992) argues that Japanese rms wait long before
they di¤erentiate between low potential and high potential employees so as not to
demotivate low potential employees. The studies mentioned above share with our
paper that decisions of managers contain information that inuences the motivation
of subordinates. Neither of these papers, however, show that condence manage-
ment can induce managers to discriminate. Crutzen et al. (2013) restrict attention
to symmetric equilibria, thereby excluding discrimination. In Prendergast (1992),
employees are not competing for tasks or a promotion.
Our paper also contributes to the huge literature on discrimination. In our
explanation for discrimination, beliefs play an essential role. In this sense, our paper
is most closely related to the literature using self-fullling prophecy models (SFPMs)
[see e.g. Arrow (1973), Coate and Loury (1993) and Mailath et al. (2000)]. In these
papers, an employee must make an investment to be qualied for a skilled job or a
demanding task. Managers do not observe employeesinvestment decisions. As a
result, whether or not a manager gives an employee a demanding task depends on her
belief about the likelihood that an employee has invested. In SFPMs a distinction is
usually made between bad and good equilibria. In bad equilibria, managers correctly
believe that employees did not invest. In good equilibria, managers correctly believe
that employees did invest. Discrimination is said to occur if a bad equilibrium exists
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for one group and a good equilibrium exists for another group. In addition to the
emphasis on beliefs, our model is similar to SFPMs in that ex post the managers
decision is optimal for the rm. However, an important di¤erence between our
model and SFPMs is the nature of discrimination. In SFPMs, discrimination is a
possible symptom. The occurrence of a bad equilibrium is the core problem. For
example, a situation where both males and females are trapped in a bad equilibrium
(no discrimination) might be regarded as inferior to a situation where females are
in a bad equilibrium and males are in the good equilibrium. To put this di¤erently,
in SFPMs one group is not discriminated against the other group. In our model,
the focus is on how one employee is treated relative to another employee. Another
important di¤erence between SFPMs and our model is that SFPMs revolve around
managers who are uncertain about which employee is the better candidate, and she
selects the one she expects to be better. In our model, the manager knows which
employee is better. Yet she may still select the weaker employee.
As discussed above, in our model the managers promotion decision maximizes
the rms prots ex post. Our explanation for discrimination is therefore not based
on some discriminatory preference of the manager or of some worker [see e.g. Becker
(1957) and Arrow (1973) for early examples of taste-based discrimination models]
or on the enforcement of some social norm as in Akerlof (1985). In fact, we show
that the manager would typically want to commit to the non-discriminatory pro-
motion rule. Of course the presence of discriminatory preferences in a society can
cause the anticipation of discrimination. Such anticipation is enough to generate
discrimination by managers who would be fair otherwise.
P¾eski and Szentes (2013) have developed a model in which agents are repeatedly
matched and must decide with whom to cooperate. Their model predicts (partial)
segregation. An agent may choose not to enter into a protable relationship with
an agent of another group now, because such a relationship would reduce the prof-
itability of relationships with agents of his own group later. Our paper shares with
P¾eski and Szentes that discrimination arises spontaneously. Moreover, like P¾eski
and Szentes, our model can explain the nding from experiments that even when
groups are articially formed, biases to individuals of their own group arise easily.
In our model this would require that articially formed groups a¤ect beliefs. Our
paper deviates from P¾eski and Szentes in two main respects. First, our model deals
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with discrimination on the workoor, while the P¾eski and Szentes model focuses on
discrimination of people who have to decide with whom to interact. The P¾eski and
Szentes model is therefore better suited for explaining segregation. Our model is
better suited for understanding the existence of glass ceilings. Second, beliefs are
key in our explanation of discrimination. A manager discriminates out of fear for
demotivating the favorite. In P¾eski and Szentes, stigmatization is key in explaining
discrimination. Individuals do not interact with individuals from the other group
out of fear for being stigmatized by members of their own group.
We are aware that many more explanations for discrimination exist. For example,
in Milgrom and Oster (1987) potential new employers do not observe the skills of
disadvantaged employees. Promotion of disadvantaged employees would reveal their
talents to competitors. This provides an incentive to managers not to promote
disadvantaged employees. Lazear and Rosens (1990) explanation for why females
are less likely be promoted than males rests on the assumption that women are
more able than men in nonmarket activities. This increases the probability that
women quit the rm, thereby weakening managers incentives to promote women.
This paper is not intended to replace all existing theories of discrimination. Rather
we show that on the workoor, discrimination is very likely, that it can take many
forms, and that it is hard to combat.
3 The task assignment game
We consider a unit, which consists of a manager, M , and two employees, 1 and 2: In
the unit two tasks have to be performed, a minor task and a major one.1 It is the
managers job to assign the tasks in such a way that the units output is maximized.
We model this as follows. If employee i, i 2 f1; 2g ; receives the major task, he
chooses e¤ort ei (ei > 0) to produce output yi = aiei, where ai denotes is ability,
and   1 is a measure of the importance of the major task relative to the minor task.
If employee i receives the minor task, he chooses e¤ort to produce output yi = aiei.
An important feature of our model is that the manager has superior information
about ai. Specically, the manager observes a1 and a2, while the employees only
1Our game can also be formulated as a promotion game. In a promotion setting, the major
task would mean getting promoted.
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know that a1 and a2 are independently drawn from a uniform distribution on the
interval [0; 1].2 At the beginning of the game, the manager assigns tasks, m 2 f1; 2g,
where m = i denotes that she gives the major task to employee i.
The employees want to contribute to the unit, but are e¤ort averse. More specif-
ically, employee is preferences are represented by
Ui (ei) =
8<: E (aijm) ei   12e2i if m = iE (aijm) ei   12e2i if m 6= i (1)
where E (aijm) is is expectation of his ability, conditional on the task assignment
decision m. The manager aims at maximizing output
UM (m; a1; a2) =
2X
i=1
yi (2)
The timing of the model is as follows. At the beginning of the game nature draws
a1 and a2. The manager observes a1 and a2, but the employees do not. Next, the
manager assigns tasks. The employees update their beliefs about their abilities, and
choose an e¤ort level. Finally, payo¤s are realized.
In our game, the employeese¤ort strategies are simple. Each employee chooses
an e¤ort level that is equal to the importance of the task times his expected ability,
conditional on the assignment decision3
ei =
8<: E (aijm) if m = iE (aijm) if m 6= i (3)
Equation (3) shows that an employees e¤ort is a positive function of his percep-
tion of his ability. Of course the reason is that in our game e¤ort and ability are
complements. A key feature of our model is the e¤ect of the managers task as-
signment decision on the employeesperceptions of their abilities. In the words of
Bénabou and Tirole (2003, p. 493), this feature of the model allows for condence
2The information structure is common in studies where organizational decisions, like the as-
signment of tasks, inuence employeesmotivation (see, for instance, Prendergast, 1992, Bénabou
and Tirole, 2003, and Ishida, 2006).
3How the allocation decision a¤ects the expected value of ai depends on the managers allocation
strategy. This allows for condence management. To keep notation simple, we suppress the latter
and simply write the expectation as E (aijm).
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management. Our set-up is the easiest set-up we could think of to show how con-
dence management leads to discrimination. Condence management requires that
an employees e¤ort depends on his perception of his ability [see (3)].
The assignment strategy of the manager, sM (a1; a2), stipulates her task assign-
ment decision, m, for all combinations of a1 and a2. We identify perfect Bayesian-
Nash equilibria in which (i) employees e¤ort strategies are optimal, given their
beliefs about their abilities; (ii) the managers assignment strategy is optimal, given
employeese¤ort strategies and beliefs; and (iii) beliefs are updated according to
Bayesrule. We identify equilibrium assignment strategies in which the task assign-
ment decisions do depend on a1 and a2.
To drive home our results in a simple way, we start with analyzing the case that
both tasks are equally important  = 1. We refer to this game as the basic game.
4 Analysis of the basic game
In this section we rst show that our basic model has three equilibria, two of which
are discriminatory. Next, we show that only the discriminatory equilibria are stable.
Finally, we show that it would be optimal for the manager if she could commit to
no discrimination. We emphasize that this tension between stability and e¢ ciency
is not the result of externalities. Rather, workoor anticipations force the manager
into behavior she would rather avoid.
4.1 Equilibria
Recall from Section 3 that for  = 1 the optimal e¤ort strategy of the employee is
given by ei = E (aijm). Now consider the manager. She prefers m = 1 to m = 2 if
m = 1 yields a higher total output than m = 2. As m a¤ects the behavior of the
employees through their beliefs, this amounts to
a1E (a1jm = 1) + a2E(a2jm = 1)  a1E (a1jm = 2) + a2E(a2jm = 2)
The manager is indi¤erent between sending m = 1 and sending m = 2 if
a1 = ta2, where t =
E(a2j2)  E(a2j1)
E (a1j1)  E (a1j2) (4)
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Figure 1: Each of the diagonal lines corresponds to one equilibrium. Any point
above (below) such a line would imply that Employee 1 (2) would get the major
task.
Equation (4) shows that the managers task-assignment strategy is characterized by
a straight line through the origin. This straight line determines for any combination
(a1; a2) which employee gets the major task. If a1  ta2, the manager gives the
major task to employee 1, while if a1 < ta2, she gives it to employee 2. The next
step is to determine this line more precisely.
In equilibrium, the employeesbeliefs about their abilities conditional on the task
assignment decision have to be consistent with the managers assignment strategy.
Using that beliefs should be self-conrming, we obtain Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Three equilibria of the basic game exist in which the managers as-
signment strategy depends on a1 and a2. These strategies are characterized by t = 1,
t = 1
2
and t = 2.
Proof: Suppose t  1. We rst calculate the beliefs for both employees, given
the assignment strategy implied by (4). Using these beliefs, we solve (4) for t.
The beliefs are: E (a1j1) =
R 1
0
R 1
ta2
a1da1da2R 1
0
R 1
ta2
da1da2
= 3 t
2
6 3t , E (a2j1) =
R 1
0
R 1
ta2
a2da1da2R 1
0
R 1
ta2
da1da2
= 3 2t
6 3t ,
E (a2j2) =
R 1
0
R ta2
0 a2da1da2R 1
0
R ta2
0 da1da2
= 2
3
, and E (a1j2) =
R 1
0
R ta2
0 a1da1da2R 1
0
R ta2
0 da1da2
= 1
3
t. The equilibrium
values of t result from solving
t =
2
3
  3 2t
6 3t
3 t2
6 3t   13t
(5)
yielding the solutions t = 1 and t = 1
2
. The case that t > 1 mirrors the case that
t  1. It yields a solution t = 2.
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Proposition 1 describes three equilibria. Figure 1 depicts them. In the equi-
librium where t = 1 the manager always assigns the major task to the more able
employee. This equilibrium is quite intuitive. The other two equilibria are, at rst
glance, less intuitive. In the equilibrium where t = 1
2
the probability employee 1 is
given the major task is three times higher than the probability employee 2 is given
the major task, even though ex ante the employees are identical. Why is the task
assignment strategy t = 1
2
self-conrming?
Suppose that employee 1 is a male and employee 2 is a female. In a world where
the employees expect that males get the major tasks unless females are at least twice
as able as males, i.e. t = 1
2
, giving the minor task to the female has a strong adverse
e¤ect on the males perception about his ability. It implies that the ability of the
male must be smaller than 1
2
(= t; see Figure 2). Consequently, the task assignment
decision has a large impact on the motivation of the man. In contrast, the female
is not nearly a¤ected as much by the task assignment decision. She knows that
even if she has maximal ability, a2 = 1; she would get the minor task only half of
the time. As a result, her self-condence remains relatively intact even if she gets
the minor task. All in all, the manager is reluctant to give the major task to a
female: the male employee needs it more to keep morale high. More generally, the
anticipation of discrimination becomes self-fullling as the task assignment decision
matters more for the condence of the employee who expects to be favored relative
to the employee who expects to be disfavored.
a2
a1
1
1
0
m=2
m=1½ t
Figure 2: The shaded area indicates the ability vectors which receive zero probability
conditional upon Employee 2 getting the major task.
11
4.2 Stability
Having established that our basic game has three equilibria, the question arises
which of the three equilibria are most likely. To answer this question, we investigate
the stability of the equilibria. Specically, suppose that the beliefs about the task
assignment probabilities held by both employees, say t^; di¤er from the equilibrium
beliefs. Without loss of generality suppose that t^ < 1: We say that the equilibrium
t = 1 is stable if for t^ close to 1; the managers optimal response to t^ is even closer
to 1, i.e. t > t^. Proposition 2 shows that the t = 1 equilibrium is unstable, while
the t = 1
2
and t = 2 equilibria are stable.
Proposition 2 The t = 1
2
and t = 2 equilibria of the basic game are stable, but
the t = 1 equilibrium is unstable.
Proof: Consider some arbitrary belief t^; where w.l.o.g. t^ 2 [0; 1] : By Bayesian
updating we obtain (see the proof of Proposition 1): E (a1j1) = 3 t^26 3t^ , E (a2j1) = 3 2t^6 3t^ ,
E (a2j2) = 23 , and E (a1j2) = 13 t^: The best response by the manager equals
t =
2
3
  3 2t^
6 3t^
3 t^2
6 3t^   13 t^
=
1
3  2t^
We now check when t > t^:
1
3  2t^ > t^
2t^2   3t^+ 1 > 0
(2t  1) (t  1) > 0
This only holds on t^ 2 [0; 1] if t < 1
2
: In contrast, for t^ 2  1
2
; 1

we obtain t < t^:
The implication is that if t^ 2  1
2
; 1

, the manager has an incentive to follow a task
assignment rule that favors employee 1 even more than anticipated: Similarly t > t^
for t^ 2 (1; 2) and t < t^ for t^ > 2: Thus t = 1
2
and t = 2 are stable equilibria, while
t = 1 is unstable. The proposition follows. 
Proposition 2 is the result of two e¤ects. The rst e¤ect has already been ex-
plained below Proposition 1. If the employees expect some degree of discrimination
in favor of males, t^ < 1, then giving the major task to a female has a larger e¤ect
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on the morale of males than on the morale of females. This gives an incentive to
the manager to give major tasks to males. The second e¤ect is that a good morale
is more important for more able employees. In the extreme case that a1 = 0, the
manager does not benet from boosting employee 1s morale. This explains why
there is a limit to the extent to which a manager is willing to conrm beliefs. If
t^ < 1
2
, the managers optimal response is characterized by t > t^.
Note that our model does not predict whether there is discrimination against
Employee 1 or there is discrimination against Employee 2. In the example of the
introduction, it is well possible that the father discriminates against his son, because
the father is known for being averse to favoritism.
Proposition 2 describes an alarming result. It shows that in a very neutral set-
ting, the equilibria with discrimination are stable, while the equilibrium without
discrimination is not stable. This helps to understand why discrimination is wide-
spread, from all times, and hard to conquer.
4.3 E¢ ciency
Proposition 2 suggests that the discriminatory equilibria are the more plausible
ones in our basic game. Now we show that discrimination is costly to the manager.
She would want to commit to the non-discriminatory rule, if possible. Moreover,
even though each employee would enjoy being favored by the assignment rule to
some extent, the ex ante expected payo¤ to each employee is maximized without
discrimination.
Proposition 3 Consider the basic game. Suppose the manager can commit to as-
signment rule t: Then
 The manager would prefer to commit to t = 1.
 Each employee would prefer some discrimination in his favor, i.e. t < 1 for
i = 1 and t > 1 for i = 2:
 The ex ante expected payo¤ to each employee is maximized if the manager
commits to t = 1:
Proof: See Appendix A 
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The intuition of Proposition 3 is straightforward. The basic model is completely
symmetric in the sense that tasks are equally important. As a result, the task assign-
ment decision is a device for conveying information about the employeesabilities. If
t = 1, the task assignment decision contains most information about the employees
abilities.
Proposition 3 also implies that a random task assignment, or alternatively, a
task allocation on the basis of seniority is not optimal. Such task assignment rules
would completely break the relationship between task assignment and the employees
abilities. As a result, the task assignment decision would not contain any information
about the employeesabilities. This would amount to t = 0 or t!1. Proposition
3 shows that these values are not optimal.
5 Analysis of the task assignment game
The basic game is a clear simplication. Typically the tasks will di¤er in their im-
portance to the rm:4 In this section we return to the task assignment game where
  1: We show three results. First, a di¤erence in task importance reduces the de-
gree of discrimination. Second, unless the di¤erence in tasks is large, discrimination
is still an equilibrium outcome. Third, as long as discriminatory equilibria exist, the
non-discriminatory equilibrium remains unstable. In short, the analysis of the basic
game extends to the full task assignment game unless the di¤erence in relative task
importance becomes too large. This is formally stated in the next proposition. The
proof is relegated to Appendix B.
Proposition 4 Consider the task assignment game, with  > 1: W.l.o.g. let t  1:
As  increases, any discriminatory assignment rule involves weaker discrimination.
If   p1:5, the unique equilibrium assignment rule is non-discriminatory. More-
over, the discriminatory equilibrium is stable if it exists, i.e. for  <
p
1:5: The
non-discriminatory equilibrium is stable only if it is unique, i.e. if   p1:5:
Figure 5 illustrates how the discriminatory equilibrium depends on . Clearly,
the more the two tasks di¤er in importance, the less the manager disciminates. The
4See also Lazear and Rosen (1990) and Ishida (2012), where tasks are assigned based on
promotions.
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intuition is straightforward. Suppose t < 1: Recall that if a2 > a1, Employee 2 is the
better candidate for the major task in terms of both productivity and motivation:
E (a2j2) > E (a1j1) : Giving the task to Employee 1 when a1  a2 therefore implies
lower performance at the important task. The reason why the manager may still
promote Employee 1 is that Employee 1 would be disproportionately demotivated if
he is passed: E (a1j2) < E (a2j1). Thus the performance at the less important task
su¤ers relatively much if it is given to Employee 1. As  increases, the motivation
of the worker at the minor task becomes relatively less important. Therefore the
manager will discriminate less, if at all.
1.00 1.05 1.10 1.15 1.20 1.25
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
eta
t
Discriminatory task assignment rule t (t < 1) as a function of relative job
importance :
This has clear implications. Discrimination should be less prevalent in jobs
where tasks vary greatly in importance. By extension, this type of discrimination
plays no role in assignment decisions where the less important task represents the
employee losing his job. There, the motivation of the employee who looses out on
the promotion is hardly relevant to the rm. This would cover up-or-out policies as
well as situations in which the manager is forced to lay o¤ one employee.
Finally, it is worth noting that our analysis suggests that by task design organi-
zations can sometimes avoid discrimination.
6 Common Prejudice
In Section 4, we have demonstrated that discrimination is likely even if the ability of
both employees come from the same distribution. The motivation of this assumption
is that the existence of discrimination is less surprising in situations where employees
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di¤er ex ante. In the present section, we examine situations where prejudice, correct
or not, suggest that top talents all come from an identiable group. For instance,
in situations where physical strength is important, there may well be a common
prejudice that all top talents will be male.5
We modify the basic game as follows. Suppose that both employees believe that
a1  U [0; ], with  > 1; while a2  U [0; 1] : Thus only employee 1 can be a top
talent with ability above 1: Let both abilities be drawn independently. The optimal
assignment rule is, as before, given by (4). We distinguish two cases. First, t  : In
this case, all equilibria are discriminatory against Employee 1. Second, t < : This
second case allows for discriminatory equilibria in favor of Employee 1, i.e. t < 1.
Consider the rst case, t  : By (4) we have that in equilibrium
t =
0@R t0 R ta20 1a2da1da2 + R 1t R 0 1a2da1da2R 
t
0
R ta2
0
1

da1da2 +
R 1

t
R 
0
1

da1da2
 
R 
t
0
R 
ta2
1

a2da1da2R 
t
0
R 
ta2
1

da1da2
1A
0@R t0 R ta2 1a1da1da2R 
t
0
R 
ta2
1

da1da2
 
R 
t
0
R ta2
0
1

a1da1da2 +
R 1

t
R 
0
1

a1da1da2R 
t
0
R ta2
0
1

da1da2 +
R 1

t
R 
0
1

da1da2
1A
=
3t  2
t
This yields two solutions for t:
t 2
(
3 
p
9  82
2
;
3 +
p
9  82
2
)
(6)
We learn three things from (6). First, if  >
q
9
8
, no real value of t solving (6)
exists. Second, for  ! 1, the equilibria converge to t = 1 and t = 2: Third, the
maximal discrimination against Employee 1 decreases in :
5Goldin and Rouse (2000) state that also in music such prejudice is not uncommon: "Many of
the most renowned conductors have, at one time or another, asserted that female musicians are not
the equal of male musicians" (p. 719). They proceed to show that the chances of female musicians
to be hired at (top) symphony orchestras were improved by the introduction of blind auditions.
This result suggests both that there was a prejudice against women, and that these beliefs were
either exaggerated or wrong.
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Now suppose that t < . Then, (4) implies that
t =
 R 1
0
R ta2
0
1

a2da1da2R 1
0
R ta2
0
1

da1da2
 
R 1
0
R 
ta2
1

a2da1da2R 1
0
R 
ta2
1

da1da2
!
 R 1
0
R 
ta2
1

a1da1da2R 1
0
R 
ta2
1

da1da2
 
R 1
0
R ta2
0
1

a1da1da2R 1
0
R ta2
0
1

da1da2
!
=
1
3   2t
Solving this condition for t yields6
t =
3
4
   1
4
q
92   8 (7)
Two features of (7) are worth mentioning. First, for  ! 1, this equilibrium
converges to t = 1
2
. Second, the larger is , the stronger is the discrimination
against Employee 2.7 It follows that in this equilibrium the manager discriminates
against Employee 2. The following proposition summarizes the ndings.
Proposition 5 Consider the modied basic game with a1  U [0; ] ;  > 1:
 Suppose  2

1;
q
9
8
i
: Then in equilibrium t 2

3 
p
92 8
4
;
3 
p
9 82
2
;
3+
p
9 82
2

:
Each equilibrium is discriminatory.
 In the rst equilibrium, t = 3 
p
92 8
4
; the manager discriminates against
Employee 2. The higher is ; the stronger the manager discriminates.
 In the other two equilibria the manager discriminates against Employee
1. The higher is , the lower is the maximal degree of discrimination
against Employee 1.
 Suppose  >
q
9
8
: Then in equilibrium t = 3 
p
92 8
4
: In this equilibrium the
manager discriminates against Employee 2. The higher is , the stronger the
manager discriminates.
6Note that t = 34 +
1
4
p
92   8 is not an eligible solution as t <  by assumption.
7Note that @@
1
4

3  
p
92   8

= 14

3  1
2
p
92 818

: This is negative as 6
p
92   8 <
18 ()
p
92   8 <
p
92 = 3:
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Proposition 5 shows that an increase in  either weakens discrimination against
Employee 1 or strenghtens discrimination against Employee 2. For high values of
, the unique equilibrium is one where the manager severely discriminates against
Employee 2. The intuition behind these results is straightforward. First, for any
t < , Employee 1 looses more self-condence if he learns that a1 < t when  is
higher. In contrast, for higher  the self-condence of Employee 2 is less a¤ected
by the assignment decision. The reason is that it is more likely that Employee 2
will get the minor task regardless of her ability, so because a1 > t; rather than due
to her ability, because a2 < a1t : Consequently, the manager has stronger incentives
to discriminate in favor of Employee 1. Second, the managers scope for condence
management depends on the extent to which an employee is uncertain about his
ability. To see this, suppose that Employee 2 receives a private signal regarding
his ability which is almost always conclusive. Then, the assignment decision of the
manager would hardly a¤ect Employee 2s perception of his ability, and in turn his
e¤ort. Granting employee 2 the major task cannot motivate much. Here, by  > 1,
Employee 2 has a better idea about his ability than Employee 1. Consequently, the
manager is less willing to favor Employee 2, if at all. Concluding, commonly shared
prejudices in favor of one employee mitigate or prevent discrimination against him,
while they aggrevate discrimination against the other employee.
7 Discrimination and initial beliefs
In our model managers discriminate in order to avoid demotivating employees. An
employee who expects to be favored learns that he cannot be good when he does
not receive the preferred task. How much this knowledge a¤ects his motivation
depends on his prior beliefs. In this section we relax the assumption that ability is
drawn from a uniform distribution. Rather we assume that ability is drawn from
a distribution with a linear density function with support [0; 1] : Our aim is to see
whether discrimination is aggrevated or mitigated if employees have more positive,
or more negative priors on their own ability.
Suppose that the density function of the ability levels is given by f (ai) =  +
2 (1  ) ai where ai 2 [0; 1] and  2 [0; 2]8 Note that for  = 1; we have the same
8This condition ensures full support over the interval [0; 1] :
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ability distributions as in the basic model. For  < 1 employees are more likely to
have high ability, while for  > 1 employees are more likely to have low ability. We
obtain the following result (the proof is in Appendix C).
Proposition 6 Consider the generalized basic game, where the density function of
ai is given by f (ai) =  + 2 (1  ) ai where ai 2 [0; 1] and  2 [0; 2] and f (ai) = 0
for all ai =2 [0; 1] : Then, in any discriminatory equilibrium, discrimination is more
severe if  < 1 while it is less severe, or non-existent if  > 1:
The intuition for this result is simple. Suppose Employee 1 is the expected
favorite, so t < 1: If the preferred task is assigned to Employee 2, Employee 1 learns
that his ability must be below t. If a priori he believed it unlikely that his ability was
higher than t; then this is not very informative. Consequently, he is less demotivated
by not getting the preferred task, making it less costly for the manager to promote
Employee 2. In contrast, if a priori the employee believed it unlikely that his ability
was below t; then not receiving the preferred task will have a large impact on his
self-condence and e¤ort. We conclude that managers incentives to discriminate
are stronger in environments where employees are more likely to be able.
8 Conclusions
This article o¤ers a new theory of discrimination in the workplace. We have shown
that in a task-assignment or promotion setting, managers tend to discriminate in
favor of the favorite out of fear that passing the favorite would severely damage his
condence in his ability.
We are silent about what in practice exactly triggers discrimination. It can be
gender, religion, skin color, age, or a love for red wine. This makes it sometimes hard
to discover discrimination. An outsider may observe a glass ceiling for women. It is
harder for an outsider to observe a glass ceiling for white wine lovers. The instability
of the non-discriminatory equilibrium makes it hard to combat discrimination. For
example, once discrimination against women is resolved, it is likely to be replaced
by another form of discrimination.
Our results have some implications which may be used to distinguish it from
the main other types of discrimination. For example, in self-fulllling prophecy
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models, a manager never promotes a candidate that is ex post weaker. In our
model, the manager sometimes does. In a model where managers would have a
taste for discrimination, discrimination would be particularly severe in an up or out
setting. In our model, discrimination does not occur in an up or out setting.
Our model is a static one. We are aware that discrimination on the workoor
also has dynamic implications. Females have incentives to eschew organizations
where they are discriminated. As a consequence, when discrimination is easy to
observe, it may eventually lead to segregation. Employees may also quit when they
learn that their kinds are not the favorite. This threat of quitting may weaken
managers incentives to discriminate. We leave these dynamic considerations for
future research.
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A Proof of Proposition 3
We prove each bullet of the proposition in turn. W.l.o.g. we restrict t to t 2 [0; 1].
First, the manager anticipates the e¤ort levels resulting from her assignment rule.
Her expected payo¤ when choosing t equalsZ 1
0
Z 1
ta2

a1
1
3t  6
 
t2   3+ a22t  3
3t  6

da1da2 +Z 1
0
Z ta2
0

a1
1
3
t+ a2
2
3

da1da2
=
(9  2t  3t2 + t3)
9 (2  t) (8)
For t 2 [0; 1], t = 1 maximizes (8).
Second, we show that an employee prefers to be favored. W.l.o.g. consider
Employee 1: Employee 1 anticipates the e¤ort levels resulting from the assignment
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rule. His expected payo¤ when choosing t equals
Z 1
0
Z 1
ta2
 
a1
1
3t  6
 
t2   3  1
2

1
3t  6
 
t2   32! da1da2 +Z 1
0
Z ta2
0
 
a1
1
3
t  1
2

1
3
t
2!
da1da2
=
(2t3   6t2 + 9)
36 (2  t) (9)
Taking rst order derivatives we get
@
@t
(2t3   6t2 + 9)
36 (2  t) =
(9  24t+ 18t2   4t3)
36 (t  2)2
which is negative at t = 1 and positive at t = 0: Thus the optimal level of t for
Employee 1 is strictly lower than 1 and strictly larger than 0 (in fact, his optimal
assignment rule would be t = 3
2
  1
2
p
3; which is roughly equal to 0:634):
Third, we show that total expected payo¤of the employees is maximized at t = 1:
This means that employees would prefer no discrimination ex ante, i.e. before they
know who would be the expected favorite. As we already know the expected payo¤of
the favorite, we now calculate the expected payo¤of the employee who is disfavored.
This is equal to:
Z 1
0
Z 1
ta2
 
a2
2t  3
3t  6  
1
2

2t  3
3t  6
2!
da1da2
+
Z 1
0
Z ta2
0
 
a2
2
3
  1
2

2
3
2!
da1da2
=
(9  4t)
36 (2  t)
Summing the total expected payo¤s of the two employees, and di¤erentiating
with respect to t on [0; 1] we obtain that t = 1 is optimal.
(2t3   6t2 + 9)
36 (2  t) +
(9  4t)
36 (2  t) =
(9  2t  3t2 + t3)
18 (2  t)
@
@t
(9  2t  3t2 + t3)
18 (2  t) =
1
18
(t  1)2
(t  2)2 (5  2t)
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As 1
18
(t 1)2
(t 2)2 (5  2t) > 0 on t 2 [0; 1] we obtain that it is in the joint interest of
the employees to have no discrimination. This concludes the proof.
B Proof of Proposition 4
We rst prove the equilibria. After that we discuss the stability results. The manager
is indi¤erent between sending m = 1 and sending m = 2 if
a1 = ta2, with t =
2E(a2j2)  E(a2j1)
2E (a1j1)  E (a1j2) : (10)
Analogous to the derivation of (5) we nd
t =
2
3
2   3 2t
6 3t
3 t2
6 3t
2   1
3
t
(11)
Solving for t, we obtain t 2 f1; tg ; where t =
p
13 262+174 1 2

2(2 1)

. Note that
(i) that t increases in ; so any discrimination becomes less severe as  increases;
(ii) for  = 1 we have t = 1
2
; and (iii) for  
q
3
2
; t  1: The latter implies that
for   p1:5, t = 1 is the unique equilibrium.9
Regarding stability, we establish for any arbitrary belief about assignment rule
t; where w.l.o.g. t 2 [0; 1], whether
2
3
2  3 2t
6 3t
3 t2
6 3t 
2  1
3
t
is higher or lower than t: Due to the 
term, our proof follows a di¤erent route than the proof of Proposition 2. We rst note
that in equilibrium we have
2
3
2  3 2t
6 3t
3 t2
6 3t 
2  1
3
t
= t: Then we check whether at any particular
equilibrium @
@t
2
3
2  3 2t
6 3t
3 t2
6 3t 
2  1
3
t
is larger or smaller than 1
 
= @
@t
t

: If @
@t
2
3
2  3 2t
6 3t
3 t2
6 3t 
2  1
3
t
< 1; then
the equilibrium is stable. If @
@t
2
3
2  3 2t
6 3t
3 t2
6 3t 
2  1
3
t
> 1 it is unstable. As
2
3
2  3 2t
6 3t
3 t2
6 3t 
2  1
3
t
is continuous
in t; if
2
3
2  3 2t
6 3t
3 t2
6 3t 
2  1
3
t
< t for some t 2 (t; 1) ; then
2
3
2  3 2t
6 3t
3 t2
6 3t 
2  1
3
t
< t for all t 2 (t; 1) :
@
@t
(2E (2j2; t)  E (2j1; t))
(2E (1j1; t)  E (1j2; t)) =  
2(t24 2t22+t2 4t4+7t2 3t+34 72+3)
(32 2t t22+t2)2 (12)
For t = 1; we obtain
9The reason is that 12( 1)
p
13  26 + 172   1  

> 1 for  > 32 : Consequently, there is
no promotion rule t; t < 1; which is a best reply when it is anticipated.
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@@t
(2E (2j2; t)  E (2j1; t))
(2E (1j1; t)  E (1j2; t)) =
(42   2)
(22   1)2
=
2
22   1
The t = 1 equilibrium is unstable if a discriminatory equilibrium exists. To see this,
note that we have 2
22 1 < 1 for  >
q
3
2
; while 2
22 1 > 1 for  <
q
3
2
: Now we
consider the t = t equilibrium. As t is an unwieldy expression, we avoid it as
follows. First we rewrite (11):
 (t) =
s
E (2j1)  tE (1j2)
E (2j2)  tE (1j1)
=
vuut 3 2t6 3t   t2 13
2
3
  t3 t2
6 3t
After some rearranging, we obtain
 (t) =
r
3 + t  t2
4  t  t2 (13)
Substituting (13) in (12) and evaluating at t = t we obtain
@
@t
(2E (2j2; t = t)  E (2j1; t = t))
(2E (1j1; t = t)  E (1j2; t = t)) =
 
2 + 4t   4 (t)2 + 2 (t)3
9  5t
We now establish that (
2+4t 4(t)2+2(t)3)
9 5t < 1:
 
2 + 4t   4 (t)2 + 2 (t)3 < 9  5t
2(t)3   4(t)2 + 9t   7 < 0
  (1  t)  7  2t + 2(t)2 < 0
It is clear that the last inequality holds for any t 2 (0; 1) : Thus the equilibrium
t = t is stable.
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C Proof of Proposition 6
The optimal assignment rule is, as before, given by (4). We rst consider the case
where t  1: The beliefs are as follows: E (a1j1) =
R 1
0
R 1
ta2
(+2(1 )a1)(+2(1 )a2)a1da1da2R 1
0
R 1
ta2
(+2(1 )a1)(+2(1 )a2)da1da2 ,
E (a2j1) =
R 1
0
R 1
ta2
(+2(1 )a1)(+2(1 )a2)a2da1da2R 1
0
R 1
ta2
(+2(1 )a1)(+2(1 )a2)da1da2 , E (a2j2) =
R 1
0
R ta2
0 (+2(1 )a1)(+2(1 )a2)a2da1da2R 1
0
R ta2
0 (+2(1 )a1)(+2(1 )a2)da1da2
,
and E (a1j2) =
R 1
0
R ta2
0 (+2(1 )a1)(+2(1 )a2)a1da1da2R 1
0
R ta2
0 (+2(1 )a1)(+2(1 )a2)da1da2
: Solving for t = E(a2j2) E(a2j1)
E(a1j1) E(a1j2) we
obtain two solutions consistent with t  1. The rst is the non-discriminatory
equilibrium t = 1: The second solution is
t =

12 74+372 53+
p
144+56442 84763+41494 7305+256+144

12( 1)(3 8) (14)
We now show that t < 1
2
,  < 1 and t > 1
2
,  > 1: The key is that
12 (   1) (3   8) is positive if  2 (0; 1) while it is negative if  2 (1; 2) : Therefore
for  < 1 we obtain

12 74+372 53+
p
144+56442 84763+41494 7305+256+144

12( 1)(3 8) <
1
2p
144 + 56442   84763 + 41494   7305 + 256 + 144 < 53   192 + 8 + 36 
144 + 56442   84763 + 41494   7305 + 256 + 144 <  53   192 + 8 + 362
36 (8  3)   11 + 52   4 (   1)2 < 0
which condition holds, as ( 11 + 52   4) < 0 for all  2 [0; 1):
For  2 (1; 2), similar calculations give the condition that t > 1
2
if ( 11 + 52   4) <
0: Therefore  > 1 decreases discrimination. We now show that the discriminatory
equilibrium can cease to exist if  > 1. Suppose  = 1:6: Then (14) gives t = 1: 0567:
This is not an eligible solution as, by assumption, t  1:
We conclude the proof by pointing out that the case for t  1 is symmetric to
t  1:
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